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THE SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS
UNDER THE KOIZUMI ADMINISTRATION1
Hideo Ohashi
INTRODUCTION
In the first half of the 2000S, the Sin°-Japanese relations were often char-
acterized by the word of seirei keinetsu (politically cold but economically
hot). Overcoming the financial crisis in the late 1990S, East Asian coun-
tries established the regional cooperative framework called the 'ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) plus Three,I comprising the
ASEAN 10 countries and the three economic powers (Japan, China, and
Korea) in the region. In the context of the `ASEAN plus Three,'Japan,
China, and Korea also tried to build trilateral constructive partnership and
make a wide range of proposals for regional economic cooperation.
In Japan, however, Mr. Junichiro Koizumi took the seat of Prime Minister
inApri1 2001 by publicly promising tovisit Yasukuni Shrine, which is dedi-
cated to the war dead including the Class-A war criminals. After he actu-
ally made an officialvisit to it, the Sino-Japanese relations suddenly be-
came soured and a number of complicated problems pending between
them abruptly emerged. Consequently, the bilateral relations were mutu-
ally frustrated to the extent that their top leaders could not payvisits to
each other for five years.
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In May 2005, the Chinese Ⅵce Premier Wu Ⅵ abruptly canceled her
meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi and directly returned home. The top
leaders'dialogue betweerl Japan and Chilla On the occasion of the `ASEAN
plus Three'meeting in autumn 2005, which had been used as alternative
opportunities for Japanese and Chinese top leaders to meet each other
regularly, was also cancelled. The channel for the top leaders'dialogue was
substantially closed in 2005.
Under the seirei condition, however, the SinoIJapanese economic rela-
tions unexpectedly expanded. What enabled the bilateral economic rela-
tions to expand so quickly? Did the se7:ref condition have any negative in-
nuence on the economic relations between them? What roles did the p0-
1itical factors play in the current bilateral relations? By replying to these
questions, this paper, focuslng On an economic aspect of the bilateral rela-
tions, considers the Sino-Japanese relations in the seirei keinetsu period
in the first half of the 2000S.
DETERIORATING BILATERAL RELATIONS
For the past decade, the Japaneseingeneral have become less familiar
with China because of its aggressive foreign behavior and the Chinese peo-
ple's growing anti-Japanese sentiment. China has been also irritated by
changing attitude of the Japanese toward modern history. Because of the
diplomatic normalization and the Peace and Friendship Treaty in the 1970S,
the atmosphere of friendship dominated the Sin°-Japanese relations, but
it became a thing of the past by the early 1990S. In other words, Japan
had normal relations with China and the two countries stopped shelving
some controversial issues in the name of friendship. Throughout the 1990S,
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China achieved a remarkable economic growth and enhanced its interna-
tional presence. The rise of China provided opportunities for neighbors
and at the same time accompanied a number of frictions and conflictswith
them.
In addition to emotional entanglements between them, the Sho-Japa-
nese relations significantly turned soured when Prime Minister Koizumi
made an officialvisit to Yasukuni Shrine. He promised Prime Minister's offi-
cial visit to it during the election campaign for the presidency of the Lib-
eral Democratic Party (LDP), the ruling party of Japan, partly because the
Japan War-Bereaved Association was the mainstay of support for his rival
candidate, former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. The repeated visits
by Koizumi and other Cabinet members to Yasukuni Shrine exasperatingly
irritated the Chinese leaders, and consequently widened the issue areas
between Japan and China ranging from historical distrust to differing terri-
torial claims. Moreover, some disrespectful behavior and insensitive official
remarks by the Japaneseintensified anti-Japanese sentiment among the
Chinese people in general.
The annual survey on publicviews on diplomacy by the Cabinet Office
of Japan iuustrates the Japanese sentiment toward China and their assess一
ment of current status of the Japan-China relations (Figure 1). The index
of the Japanese affinitywith China drastically droppedin1989 when the
mananmen Square Incident occurred, accompanied by a continuous drop
in the mid-1990s when China repeated a series of atomic bomb tests and
threatened Taiwan by militaⅣ exercise with missile launchings. The index
further dropped in 2004.Another index of the Japanese assessment of the
bilateral relations also traces similar curves.
Not a few of the Japanese actually recognized a serious threat血.om
FIGURE 1 THE JAPANESE PUB Ll C VIEWS ON CHINA 
( A ) 00 you feel an affinity with ( B) 00 you think Japn has god 
Ch ina? rela tions w ith China? 
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China becaus of its authoritarian represion of pro-demcay movem ent 
and its contiuos military buildup. The rise of China provide the Jap-
nese an oprtunity to reconsider the role of Japnes Oficial Devlop-
m ent Asistance (ODA) to China. Until the Japnes governmt's decison 
to phas e out the ODA to China ， the later was the world largest recipient 
of th e forme aid. Most of Japnes e w ere wiling to provide an adequt 
level of ODA to China becaus they as wel as the Chines regade the 
aid as repartions for Japan's wartime behavior. Howevr ， the Japnes 
vi ews regarding the ODA to China have significantly changed. First ， China 
has achievd a remakble econmi growth and ben a donr to other de-
veloping countries. Then ， Japan's ODA charter does not alow its fund to 
be used for military purose and requires monitoring th e military expndi-
tur e of the recipient countries ， but China continues its military buildup. 
Th e Japnes governmt also pays atention to the fungibility of its ODA 
for oth er use in China. Mor eover ， ther has ben an increasing public 
opinon that Japn should not show genrosity evn to its potential exter-
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nal threat. These facts negated the need for Japan's ODA to China.
The Japanese resentment against China consequently emerged when the
Japanese soccer team won the Asian Cup held in China in summer 2004. A
number of the Japanese youths, who were usually little interested in China,
Witnessed on TV that the Chinese spectators unreasonably booed the Japa-
nese team throughout the event and some of them finally attacked an offi-
cial car of the Japanese embassy when the Japanese team defeated China
in the final. Incidents such as the offshore oil development by a China's
state-Owlled enterprlSe in the area of disputed waters and the intrusion
into Japanese territorial waters by a China'S submarine further intensified
the Japanese anti-Chinese sentiment.
The Japanese were intolerably shocked by the anti-Japanese demonstra-
tions in major cities in China in spring 2005. At first, the demonstrators
were against Japan's desire to become a permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council. Some of them rushed headlong into violence, at-
tacked the Japanese companies and restaurants,violated a provision of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that defined the premises of a
foreign mission as inviolable, and called for a boycott of Japanese goods.
Most of the Japanese felt further antipathy toward China because the Chi-
nese authority and mass media abstained from reporting these incidents
domestically. They realized that China had become a multi-Valued society
and the growlng anti-Japanese sentiment was not led by the govemment
but extensively shared by the Chinese grass roots.
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DEEPENING ECONOMIC RELATIONS
China as an LEconomic Threatl
The SinoIJapanese economic relations unexpectedly developed throughout
the seirei period, although there was a particular concern that the bilat-
eral relations would go from bad to worse or from seirei kei77,etSu tO
seirei keiryo (Politically cold and economically cool) A China became Ja-
pan's largest import partner in 2002. In the 'lost decade'of the 1990S, Chi-
nese products which were more competitive in a value-for-money sense
metwith the Japanese consumers'favorina severe recession. A large
number of them were the products developed by Japanese distributors for
their Japanese consumers and mostly made by Japanese subsidiary facto-
ries locatedinChina. During the period of 'bubble economy'from the late
1980s to the early 1990S, Japan increased imports of brand-name mer-
chandise such as high-priced luxury cars and designer-label goods from
Europe. A decade-long recession totally changed the Japanese attitude to-
ward consumption.
A rapid surge in imports from China had serious impacts on Japanese in-
dustries. Under the powerful political pressure, Japanese government im-
posed provisional safeguard measures to curb the imports of three agricul-
tural products (leeks, fresh shiitake mushrooms, and rush mats for tatami
flooring)inApri1 2001. Since these items were mainly imported from
China, the safeguard measures primarily targeted Chinese products. In re-
sponse to the measures taken by Japanese government, the Chinese gov-
ernment retaliated by imposing a 100 percent special tariff on imports of
four Japanese manufactured products (automobiles, cellular phones, car
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phones, and air conditioners) in June 2001.2
Reaching an agreement after several rounds of negotiations, Japanese
government did not invoke full safeguard measures and the Chinese gov-
ernment withdrew its countermeasures at the end of 2001.3 protectionist
measures would be obviously against the basic principles of free trade re一
gime from which Japan has benefited throughout the post-war period, and
have adverse effects on structural reform in Japan. They also impair the
interests of Japanese consumers gained from Chinese products and Japa-
nese firms earnestly engaged in China business. Needless to say, social
costs of protecting domestic industries are tremendously increasing.
Growing mports from China put immeasurable pressure on industrial
adjustment in Japan. Faced with the increaslng number of bankruptcies
and unemployment, a lot of Japanese tried to attribute ongoing economic
difficulties to the rise of China. Awide range of Japanese industries per-
ceived China as an `economic threat.'China was also charged with an `ex-
port of deflation.'Criticism was focused on the following two points. First,
China's economic growth was driven by low-priced exports at the expense
of Japan and other neighboring economies. Second, the Chinese govern一
meれt should take measures to counter domestic denation or appreciate
the Chinese renminbi (RMB). Undoubtedly deflation was rooted in differ-
ent causes in the two countries, although the revaluation of RMB would
make positive contributions to redress the imbalances in the world econ-
omy. In Japan, deflation was mainly caused by the sharp drop of the asset
markets such as real estate and stocks. Theseviewpoints, therefore, simply
reflected the Japanese lost confidence in its economy and their Jealousy
over China's economic success.
Increasing imports from China and Japanese massive investments in
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China led to the hollowlng Out Japanese industries. Many Japanese prod-
ucts, laboトintensive products in particular, Were defeated by competitive
products imported from China. A number of Japaneseindustries shifted
their manufacturing plants to China to get access to the rapidly growing
local market and to reduce production costs by uslng ample and cheap lo-
cal labor. Consequently, not a few of Japanese businesses were forced to
close doⅥT and unemployment rate unprecedentedly rose. Dai-Ichi Life
Research lnstitute (2001) indicated that the shift of Japanese manufactur-
ing industries to China decreased the domestic sales by 2.3 percent and
the number of full-time workers by 0.9 percent in these industries in 1998
-2000.Another empirical study by Fukao and Yuan (2001) estimated that
the loss of manufacturing jobs would amount to 577,000 during 1987-1998
due to Japanese outward investment in East Asia, but the study also
pointed out that the job opportunities created in the same period would
cover job losses caused by Japanese outward investment. It is almost im-
possible to demonstrate a causal relationship between Japanese investment
in China and the hollowing out of Japanese industries, but it is true that
numerous opportunities created in China had considerable impacts on
Japanese industries and structural reform.
Chiztese Special Procurement Boom4
China's economy overcame unfavorable effects of Asian financial crisis and
domestic denation by the early 2000S. China joined the WTO at the end of
2001. Expecting the liberalization of its huge domestic market, foreign
capital massively rushed into China and boosted stagnant economy by
spurringincreases in fixed asset investment and export. China's booming
economy and its accession to the WTO created numerous opportunities for
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busineses and industries all over the world . Japnes firms also unexpct -
edly benfited from Chugoku toku) μ(Chines special procuemnt bom) 
Taking thes oportunites ， Japnes econmy could acelrate the pace 
of recovery from a deca- long recesion. As is repatedly sen in the re -
covery proces of Japnes econmy in the past ， export once agin played 
an extrmely importan role. Especialy a rapid increase in export to China 
enlargd Japnes export as a whole ， and consequntly bosted its falter-
ing econmy (Figure 2) .5 
Througt a deca of recsion ， Japnes firms strug led to reinforce 
and restructure their busines by abolishing unprofitable sectors ， by reduc -
ing excs production capcity ， and by laying surplus workes of f. Their 
expandig exports to China contributed to rapid improvents in their 
busines perfomanc and a rebound of Japnes econmy as a whole 
FIGURE 2 CHINA 'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE RECOVERY 
OF JAPANESE ECONOMY 
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from a prolonged recession. China's growing demands for resources and
materials caused by the booming economy were so huge that its appetite
for them could increasingly affect their international prices.
China's heavy demand for steel had many spillover effects on Japanese
industries. In response to it, Japanese steel makers expanded production
and increased exports to China. 'Special procurement'from China quickly
improved their business performance and made them embarked on new in-
vestments in plant and equipment. Their new investments to eI山ance their
production capacity, Coupled with heavy investments by Chinese steel
makers, stimulated Japanese plant industry to be actively engaged in China
-related business. China's growing imports of steel products and materials
(iron ore and coal) pushed up freight charges. This also induced Japanese
shipping business to be revitalized. Since shipping firms began to place or-
derswith shipbuilders for new merchant vessels to meet China's growing
demands, Japanese shipbuilding industry as well benefited from China. As
a comprehensive assembly industry, shipbuilding requires a great number
of equipment and materials. China'S Ⅵgorous appetite for steel had an ex-
traordinaIY 1mpaCt On a Wide range of Japanese industries including steel,
oil refinery, shipping, and shipbuilding, all of which had been recognized as
`structurally-depressed industries'in Japan.
In the Chugoku tokuju in Japan, not only many industries directly re-
sponding to China's industrialization but also other business to meet its va-
riety of demands greatly benefited from the booming economy. Reflecting
China's overheated demands for houslng, infrastructure construction, and
urban development, Chha had the world largest market for construction
machinery by the early 2000S, Japanese construction machinery industry
expanded the exports to China and increased the local productioninChina.
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Most of the firms in this indust ry returned to profitabiliy by eruarging 
Chin a busin es s. Japn ese major genral co ntra ctors also rega rd ed China as 
a fast- growin mark et ， and m ade bold efort s to ent er into new busin es 
in this big em erging market . 
China is cur entl y in a proc es of rapid motrization. Surpasing Japn ， 
China beca me the world second big est automb il e m arket in 206 . Con -
sid ering the great numb er of parts and mat er ials to be us ed for manuf c-
turing the fina l produ cts ， autombile industr y should hav e m any spilov er 
efects on a wide rang e of Jap anes industri es. Chin a's rising co nsumptio 
wo uld create hug e demands for servic es su ch as tourism ， restaurant ， 
w hol esale /r eta il busin es s， and co muni cat ion services. Chin a busin es ce r-
ta iru y co ntribut ed to an improv em ent in perfomanc of Japn ese firms
whic had be n fa ced with a slugish dom estic eco nomy . 
As a result of a rapid in crease in trade with China ， acording to the 
trade outlok of the Japn Exte rn al Tr ad e Organization (JE TRO 20 7)， 
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China is expected to be the largest trade partner of Japan in 2007. China
became the largest import partner in 2002 as mentioned above. China plus
Hone Kong6 was the largest trade (export and import) partner in 2004
(Figure 3)･ The rise of China has drastically changed the trade and indus-
trial structure of Japan.
China's Involvement in Regional Production Network
ln the post-war period, East Asian economies including Japan, the Asian
Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs), and the ASEAN countries
achieved unprecedentedly high economic growth by increasing exports
mainly to the United States.All of them have been the primary beneficiar-
ies of the free trade system under the General Agreement of Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)/WTO regime. The United States as the embodiment of free
trade system has been the most open market in the world. China is cur-
rently following the same path as other East Asian economies have traced,
but China's trade and industrial structure is quite different from that of its
neighbors.
Most of East Asian economies have been engaged in processing trade by
importing materials and intermediate input goods mainly from Japan. Us-
ing their ample and cheap labor, they processed and assembled them into
the final goods, mostly labor-intensive manufactured goods, and directly
exported them to the world largest market in the United States. Faced
with rising production costs and revaluation of their currencies, however,
they had to readjust their development strategies. A great manyindustries
shifted their production plants to foreign countrieswith less production
costs･ China has been the main destination for their overseas production
since it launched the policy of reform and opening-up at the end of the
Unit: Billion $ 
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1970s. 
Located in the center of international division of labor in East Asia， 
China has increased the export-production in the form of the following tri-
angular trade among East Asia， China， and the United States. East Asian 
economies， including Japan， Korea， and Taiwan， export parts and materials 
to China， process and assemble them into the final goods in China， and ex-
port them from China to the United States. Multinational corporations， for-
eign firms， and their subsidiaries in China lead the export-production and 
the triangular trade among them. As a result， China has large trade deficits 
with the neighbors and huge trade surplus with the United States and 
Europe (Figure 4).7 
China currently accelerates an economic growth by participating in in-
FIGURE 4 CHINA'S TRIANGULAR TRADE: TRADE BALANCE WITH 
MAJOR PARTNERS (2006) 
Ex port ImportBalaO! ::e! 
Japan 91.64 115.72 -24.08 
Korea 44.53 89.78 -4 5.25 
Taiwan 20.74 87.11 -66.37 
Total 156.91 292.61 明135.70
Defict +・Ch ，;na
' Surplus t 
Intermediate Goods Trade 
ι 
e A u  a T・峨n u。G a n F r  
Ex por 1加 rport BaJa'OC: e 
Thailand 9.76 17.96 側8.20
Malaysia 13.54 23.57 -10.03 
Indonesia 9.45 9.61 -0.16 
Philippines 5.74 17.67 -11.93 
Total 38.49 68.81 。0.32
Export Import，、 Balance
Hong Kong 155.39 10.79 144.60 
US 203.47 59.21 
EU 181.98 90.32 91.66 
Total 540.84 160.32 380.52 
Source: GAC (2006). 
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ternational export-production network in East Asia, ln Other words, by be-
ing involved in the global supply chains. In the past decade, intraregional
trade in East Asia grew faster than the world trade as a whole, even
though most of East Asian economies suffered serious damage from the fi-
nancial crisis in the late 1990S. A rapid increase in intraregional trade
could be primarily explained by the rise of China. Involved in the global
supply chains, China has considerably changed the trade patterns in East
Asia. As for the direction of trade, intraregional trade has become a domi-
nant form of trade in East Asia. The ratio of intrareglOnal trade to total
trade in East Asia rose from 33.4 percent to 54.2 percent during the pe-
riod of 1980-2003･8 The regional export-production network has changed
not only the direction of trade but also the trade co…odity structure in
East Asia. In 2000, for example, the intermediate goods accounted for 68.0
percent of the NIEs exports to their neighbors (other NIEs, ASEAN, and
China), while the final demand goods represented 62.7 percent of Chinese
total exports to the UIlited States (Ohashi 2005 : 74-76). In short, the in-
termediate input goods such as parts and materials are circulating in the
form of intraregional trade in East Asia, while the final goods mostly made
in China are massivelyflowing into the United States. As the 'world fac-
toIY,'China has become the hub of the export-production network in East
Asia.
The fundamental changesinproduct architecture in the 1990s have also
increased China's industrial competitiveness (Ohashi 2006a). Modular
products represented by information technology (IT) hardware are cur
rently dominant in the world market. They consist of standard components
plainly designed for interface, most of which can be easily outsourced in
open market and simply assembled even by unskilled workers. Modular ar一
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chitecture is most suitable to mass production. In manufacturing modular
products, assembly process makes least profit while both the upstream and
the downstream of the value chain are more profitable. Low entry barrier
makes it easy to participate in assembly business because most modular
products are full of high-technology components but their assembly does
not need any high-technology. Severe competition among new participants
in assembling modular products has made this business least pro丘table.
Since high-technology components can be labor-intensively assembled on
a mass quantity basis in China, a great number of industries have shifted
their assembly process to Chha.
Modular products do not need an integrated production process because
of their simple interface among standardized components. Their produc-
tion process can be fragmented into several manufacturing processes and
their production plants can be located in the most suitable places for each
manufacturing process. Due to the revolutionary changes in communica-
tion and transportation, the service link costs between production plants
have decreased to a minimum. Manufacturers of modular products shifted
some manufacturing processes to China in the form of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI). China also benefits from the fragmentation of production
process in manufacturing industries. As a result, modular architecture re-
quires a reassessment of the `nying一geese'mode19 0f East Asian economic
development､ This development pattern has been based on the changlng
comparative advantage h East Asia, but FDI can readily transfer a set of
production factors and has a criticalinfluence on the factor endowments
in host countries. With a great amount of FDI, China has successfully
caught up the `fore-geese'in leading manufacturing industries.
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Growlng Intraindustry and IntrafirmTrade IJed by FDI
Japanese FDI in China has been growing since Deng Xiaoping called for an
acceleration of reform and openlng-uP policy in 1992. The total number of
Japanese manufacturing plants in China exceeded that of ASEANinthe
mid-1990s and that of the United States in 2000. According to an annual
questionnaire survey on outward investment of Japanese manufacturing in-
dustries conducted by Japan Bank for htemational Cooperation (JBIC) ,
China has been regarded as the most promising destination since 1997.10
Since the severe acute respiratory spIdrome (SARS) scare in 2003 and
particularly the anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005, most of Japanese
big businesses have taken a newinvestment strategy of 'China plus one,'
under which they try to establish another overseas manufacturing plant
outside China in order to reduce the 'China risk,'although China is still the
primary destination of Japanese FDI.
In the 1990S, Japan's manufacturing investments in China were mostly
made by labor-intensive industries. Some of them were called watari-
dori or migrant birds which were likely to make swift shifts of their plants
from place to place according to the changes in production costs. In the
2000S, however, the Japanese leading industries entered full scale business
in China. Automobile manufacturers including Toyota, Nissan, and Honda,
often called the Japanese 'Big Three, ' established their manufacturing
plants in Guangzhou and other major Cities in China.ll Automobile is a
product of comprehensive assembly industry uslng 30-40 thousands of
parts. Japanese automobile manufactures usually accompany a good mum-
ber of affiliate parts manufacturers when they invest abroad. Automobile-
related investments have accounted for a considerable part of Japanese
FDI in China since 2001.12
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0verseas production of Japanese manufacturing industries is rapidly
growing mainly because of their shift of manufacturing plants to China･
Japanese subsidiaries in NorthAmerica are in general domestic sale-ori-
ented, while those of East Asia, especially China, are more export-ori-
ented. Over a half of their products made in East Asia is usually exported,
a half of which is to Japan, although their products are increasingly sold in
local markets as the host countries become affluent. In 1997-2005, Japan's
exports to North America remained almost unchanged because the Japa-
nese subsidiaries enhanced the local production capacity and Japanese ex-
ports were substituted for their local production. Not only Japanese ex-
ports to China but also their subsidiaries'local sales in China drastically in-
creased in the same period. In 2005, more than 90 percent of their prod-
ucts were domestically sold in the North America, while their products
made in China were mainly exported and their exports to Japan accounted
for almost 30 percent of their sales in China (Table 1), Export ratio of
Japanese subsidiariesinChina reached their peak in the first quarter of
2003, when their parent丘rms accounted for 25 percent of their total sales,
40 percent of their exports, and 73 percent of their exports to Japan.
These figures reveal that the growlng bilateral trade between Japan and
China mostly take a form of intraindustry andintrafirm trade.
Foreign hvested丘rms (FIFs) have played very important roles in the
development of China's foreign trade. In 2005, they represented 58 percent
of China's export and import respectively. Japanese丘rms and their subsidi-
ariesinChina constitute far greater portion of the bilateral tradewith
China than that of the FIFs in China's overall trade (Figure 5), In this re-
spect, therefore, it is also suggested thatintraindustry and intrafirm trade
is increasingly dominant in the Sin°-Japanese economic relations. In addi-
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TABLE 1 SALES OF JAPANESE SUBSIDIARIES IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CHINA Unit : Billion Yen
1997　　　　　　　2005
World Japan's Exports to the World
Total Sales of Subsidiaries
Domestic Sales
Export to Japan
Export to Third Countries
North Japan's Export to the North America
America Total Sales of Subsidiaries
Domestic Sales
Export to Japan
Export to Third Countries
China Japan's Export to China
Total Sales of Subsidiaries
Domestic Sales
Export to Japan
Export to Third Countries
Source : MOP (2006) and METI (2006b).
tion to intraindustry and intrafirm trade, a number of Japanese distributors
also contribute to the development of the bilateral trade by developing a
wide range of products in China mainly targeted for the Japanese consum-
ers. These products including garments and vegetables are customized and
imported by Japanese distributors, which is called `development import.I
Japanese FIFs have already become a firmly rooted in China. They have
made positive contributions to China's economic growth by increasing ex-
ports, by transferring technology to local丘rms, and by encouraging com-
petition in local markets. Japanese FIFs also created 9.2 million of job op-
portunities by 2005 according to China's Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai
(Press Office 2005).13 This figure is much larger than the current number
of the unemployed in China.14
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FIGURE 5 EXPORT DESTINATIONS AND IMPORT SOURCES OF FOREIGN 
INVESTED FIRMS (FIFs) IN CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE 
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Industrial Infrastuc ture Shared by M anufactres 
FDI is not only a capital flow but a dynamic migration of mangemnt re -
sources including production technolgy ， mangemnt know -how ， brand ， 
technolgy - devlopmnt and information -gathering ability ， leading posi-
tion in material ， product ， and financial markets ， and so on. As Japnes 
FDI in China increase ， both Japnes and Chines manufctres have re-
ce ntly lea rned to shar e industrial infrastructure most of whic was devel-
oped in Japn. This constitutes a substantil portion of redistributin proc-
ess of manufctring resources in Japn and improvent of productivty 
and eficiency in manufctring industries in China. 
Chines products are increasingly competive in international markets. 
Fa ced with the competive products made in China ， not a few of Japnes 
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products have been forced to retreat from both marketsinChina and Ja-
pan.Although Japaneseindustries are losing to China in their final product
markets, they are of great competitiveness in manufacturing parts and ma-
terials. Accepting these challenges, they have changed their product
strategies. Instead of selling the final productsinChina, they give priority
to export their key parts and components to China. Until the mid-1990S,
Chinese manufacturers imported most of key partsand components such
as the cathode-ray tubes (CRY) for TVs and the compressors for aiトCOn-
ditioners from Japan. Even today, they still depend on outsourcing rather
than self-manufacturing them.15 chinese manufacturers in general have a
tendency to prefer the development of new products in the shortest time
by introducing existing technology or imitating the latest models rather
than the investment in research and development (R&D) and human re-
source. As a result, Japanese industries are able to expand the exports of
key parts and components to China although they strugglewith the declin-
ing market share of the final products. As is often the casewith the deve1-
0ping economies in East Asia, China's imports from Japan are likely to ex-
pand structurally as their exports increase･16
Although China currently increases imports of parts and components
from Japan, it takes a different way from other economiesinEast Asia.
China has far greater demands for them than others. Instead of importing
key parts and components from Japan, Chha could attract a large number
of Japanese parts and components manufacturers by flaunting its ex-
tremely large domestic markets. In fact, a number of Japanese parts and
components manufacturers are rushing into China because their important
customers and users shift their production plants to China. In addition to
anincrease in Japanese parts and components manufacturers in China, 10-
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cal manufacturers are also improving their product quality and delivery
schedule. As a result, Japanese manufacturing industries are speedily ra主s-
ing their local content rate in China (Figure 6) and achieving a swiR eam-
ings recovery.
Japanese supporting industries also shift their manufacturing plants to
China. Take mold manufacturing industry as a good example. Mold manu-
facturingindustry is one of the most important supportingindustries. A
number of Japanese mold manufacturers have already started their pro-
duction in China. Since molds are indispensable to mass production, they
are often called 'mother tools of industries.'Highly refined and precise
molds are main sources of international competitiveness of Japanese
manufacturing industries, especially automobiles, electronics, and machine
tools. Japan is the leading country in manufacturing molds, usually ac-
FIGURE 6　LOCAL CONTENT RATES OF JAPANESE OVERSEAS
SUBSIDIARIES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
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Counting for more than one fourth of the shipment value of molds in the
world (EconomicAnalysis Department 2006 : 69).Trade missions from
abroad and foreign political leaders often payvisits to Ota-ku in Tokyo
and Higashi Osaka, both of which are noted for mold manufacturing indus-
try clusters. But the industry consists of numerous smau and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) without strong management base, which ac-
Counted for more than a half of the shipment value in Japan in 2005.
Japanese mold manufacturers are currently facing formidable challenges.
As their main customers and users, typically automobile and electronics in-
dustries, shift their production to China, their domestic production and ex-
port are continuously decreasing. They are in competitionwith imported
molds because mold manufacturersinEast Asia are also improving the
quality of their products. China has an extremely huge demand for molds,
but the local manufacturers have difficultiesinmaintaining high precision
and cannot manufacture particularly specified and extra-large molds.
Moreover, skilled workers with experienced practice are in short supply
(JASME 2004 : 67-68). Japanese manufacturing industries operating in
China need high-quality and fine-tuned molds, and urge Japanese mold
manufacturers to set up their factories in China.
Mold manufacturing industry is a typical case of the Japanese SMEs'op-
eration in China.17Although the SMEs and other local traditional industries,
most of which are also the SMEs without strong management base, have
supported the industrialization and economic growth in Japan, they are
currently on a long-term declining trend. They are struggling with con-
stant demands from their customers and users for the reduction in pro-
duction costs and in severe competition with imported products. Most of
them runs their factories in town and are often required by neighborhood
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residents to move out of town because of noises and environmental degra-
dation. Moreover, they are seriously ln Short of successors in business･
Most of the SMEs do not have any definite successors to their business be-
cause of unfavorable business prospects and poor working conditions.
These problems have made them close their business. Consequently, a
large number of condominium buildings, apartment houses, and parking
structures are standing together in specific areas of town originally devell
oped as industrial zones. Not a few of Japanese engineers who have ever
worked for the SMEs or reach the mandatoIY retirement age find their
new jobs and are hired by local industries in China･ In this way, Japanese
industrial infrastructure hcluding human resources is constantly trans-
planted in China and it is in a sense shared by both Japanese and Chinese
manufacturers.
IN SEARCH OF NEW RELATIONS
Seikei Bunri (Separation of Politics from Economy)
Political factors have often caused troubles in the SinoIJapanese relations
in the post-war period. At the same time, the two countries have occa-
sionally had political showdowns for problem-solving between them･ Until
1972, they tried to normalize the diplomatic relations by expanding eco-
nomic exchanges and by refraining from political inteⅣention in their eco-
nomic activities. The word of seikei bunri (separation of politics from
economy) was one of the most important principles to normalize the Sino-
Japanese relations. But it was not easy to maintain the state of separation
of politics血･om economy although Japanese business sought to expand
economic relations with China without any political inteⅣention.
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A氏er the diplomatic normalization, the Sin°-Japanese economic rela-
tions could not be free from politics. In the 1980S, the economic relations
were basically defined by the bilateral long-term trade agreement. In the
mid-1980S, crude oil accounted for almost a half of Japan's imports from
China while iron and steel represented more than 30 percent of Japan's
exports to China. In the 1990S, the political framework of Japan'S ODA to
China dominated the bilateral economic relations. In response to China's
repeated atomic bomb tests in the mid-1990S, Japan's grant aid except for
humanitarian assistance was temporarily suspended. The Japanese govern-
ment's decision considerably deteriorated the Sin°-Japanese relations as a
whole.
In the first half of the 2000S, the separation of politics from economy
was unexpectedly achieved. In addition to China's accession to the WTO,
the seirei keinetsu condition unpredictably lifted the political constraints
on the bilateral economic relations. The Sin°-Japanese economic relations
have unprecedentedly developed by a temporary retreat of troublesome
political factors from the bilateral relations. Without any spell of political
inteⅣention, the Sin°-Japanese economic relations certainly expanded as
mentioned above.
Mr. Shinzo Abe assumed office as the premier in September 2006. In his
best-seller book, de facto his election program, he proposed to establish
the prlnCiple of separation of politics from economy to stabilize the rela-
tions with China, and stated more concretely as follows ; "Political issues
should not spill over into economic issues. Economy should not be utilized
to achieve political purposes. Economic interests should be mutually re-
spected. The principle could work as a brake on deteriorating relations
with China" (Abe 2006a : 153).18
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Economy in Command?
As the Sin°-Japanese economic relations expand, the number of economic
disputes is inevitably increasing and some of them have became political
issues between the two countries. Japanese凸rms have sometimes met
with severe criticism from the Chinese consumers and customers, which
included idiscriminatory'treatment of the Chinese passengers by Japan
Airlines (JAL) , 'defective'laptop computers of Toshiba, TV commercial
looking to `disgrace'China by Tbyota, and so on. In autumn 2006, a brand
of cosmetics made by a Japanese subsidiary of the U.S. multinational was
under criticism. The Japanese government released the new regulation on
unsafe level of pesticide residue found in food a few months ago. The new
regulation put a curb on the imports of agricultural products from China.
There was a rumor implying that critical comments on the cosmetics were
made in retaliation for the Japanese government's new regulation.
There is no denying the possibility that these economic disputes would
be sublimated into political issues. Even if the economic relations progress
favorably, the two countries do not have any specific mechanism to confhe
the economic disputeswithin the bounds of normal behavior and to avoid
the sublimation of them into political issues. It is necessaIy tO take mutual
confidence building measures eveninbilateral economic relations. In this
context, the government-t0-government negotiations and the 'normal rel
lations'are indispensable to further economic relations between Japan and
China.
In the seirei kei71etSu period, a number of governmenトt0-government
negotiations to promote trade and investment were temporarily suspended
despite the earlier commitments made by the top leaders. For example
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there were some progress in the cooperation of protection of environment
and intellectual property right (IPR). The study on the trilateral invest-
meれt arrangements among Japan, China and Korea were temporarily sus-
pended, which was based on the joint declaration by the three top leaders
on the occasion of the `ASEAN plus Three'meeting in October 2003. The
purposes of the agreements are to promote trade and investment, to en-
large employment, to upgrade industrial structure, and to accelerate eco-
nomic growth through an increase in FDI among the three countries. The
arrangements should have been the first step for strengthening economic
partnership among them. Economic integration under the free trade agree-
ment (PTA) is another goal for the Sin°-Japanese economic relations
(OhasI七2003). Throughout the seirei kei7WtSu Period, however, the two
countries competed with each other for the PTA partners in the world.
By the establishment of the Abe administration, the Sin0-Japanese eco-
nomic relations had lost momentum for further progress because Japanese
FDI in China, an engine for deepening bilateral economic relations, went to
peak out. In 2006, Japanese FDI in China decreased by 20.8 percentin
number and 29.6 percent in utilized value respectively over the previous
year (Shangwubu 2007). Following the strategy of `China plus one,'Japa-
nese FDI set out for other countries in East Asia. In particular, Vietnam
and India, both of which were primarily regarded as substitutes for China,
benefited from increaslng investments from Japan. Between Japan and
China, there were an increasing number of issues necessaⅣ to rely on the
political leadership to make decisions.
Prime Minister Abe visited China and Korea to beginthe process of re-
palrlng the relationswith them iITuTlediately after his assumption of office
as the premier. Just before his visit to China and Korea, he made a speech
THE SINO_JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS UNDER THE KOIZUMI ADMINISTRATION　155
in the Diet as follows ; "China and South Korea are important neighboring
countries. Japan-China and Japan-South Korea relations are now un-
precedentedly close in economic and so many other areas. I believe that
strengthening bonds of trust with both countries is extremely important
for the Asian region and the entire international community, and it is es-
sential to make mutual efforts so that we can have futurel0riented,frank
discussions with each other" (Abe 2006b). Mr. Abe has been regarded as a
hard-liner to China, while Prime Minister Abe seemed to have changed his
attitude toward China. In search of new relations, the time has come when
politics should contribute to not only further deepening of the bilateral
economic relations but also overall development of the Sin°-Japanese rela-
tions.
Implications for New Relations between Japan and China
The Sin°-Japanese relations in the seirei kei77/etSu period in the first half
of the 2000s have some important implications for their new relations.
First, economic growth and stability are of great importance to both Ja-
pan and China. Their economies are heavily dependent on foreign factors
including forelgn demand, foreign capital, foreign technology, and some-
times foreign pressure or gaiatsu. In the first half of the 2000S, foreign
demand, especially export to China, made the greatest contributions to the
recovery of Japanese economy from the prolonged recession. Japanese
business revived due to Chugoku tokuju and survived through the FDI in
China. China's booming economy also relies on trade and FDL Export ac-
celerates China's economic growth and the FIFs account for nearly 60 per-
cent of its export. Chha's industries massively introduce technology as
well as FDI from Japan. The two governments of Japan and China have
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their source of legitimacy in economic growth and stability, and they pur-
sue positive foreign economic policies to accomplish such economic objec-
tives.
Second, development of bilateral economic relations is generauy re-
garded as a `last resort'to stab山ze the Sin°-Japanese relations. Even if
political factors lead to worsened relations, economic exchanges nowadays
are so interdependent that both Japan and China cannot maintain eco-
nomic growth and stability without developmg cooperative relations with
each other. The two countries should build the multitiered and multifac-
eted economic cooperation to raise the level of economic relations. Eco-
nomic relations solely depending on exchange of commodities are likely to
be volatile, but those based on the FDI tend to irreversibly diversifyand
deepen the economic relations. In the seirei keinetsu period, Japanese
FDI in China greatly contributed to the development of the Sin°-Japanese
economic relations. Japanese automobile industries in particular made
such a huge amount of investments in China, accompanying a large mum-
ber of affiliated companies, that they could change the SinoIJapanese
trade structure to a considerable extent.
Third, effective and timely policy measures are req山red to secure eco-
nomic relations between Japan and China. On the occasion of Prime Minis-
ter Abe'Svisit to ChinainOctober 2006, the joint press statement, empha-
sizing a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic inter-
ests, proposed a wide range of bilateral cooperation (MOFA 2006).19 Before
hisvisit to Japan in April 2007, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao also
proposed the bilateral cooperation in the field of energy saving, environ-
ment protection, high-technology, SMEs, finance, and IT (Asahi Shimbu7%,
April 4, 2007). Both countries, especially China, tend to emphasize the an-
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niversary events to enhance friendship and partnership between them.
Considering thevital importance of bilateral economic relations, however,
both countries should propose more effective and timely policy measures
according to business cycle. Under the seirei kei7WtSu Period, the econo-
mies of both countries showed upward tendencies respectively. It was not
necessary for the two governments to launch any specific policy measures
to develop economic relations. But the booming economies would not last
forever･ The two governments should consider more realistic policy meas-
ures to spur bilateral economic relations in preparation for a dowI一turn in
the economy. In case of weaker economy, it is necessary to con丘rm the
role of politics in the Sin°-Japanese relations.
1　The earlier version of this paper was presented at the Sin°-Japanese Relations
Workshop, organized by St.Anthony's College, Oxford University, On December 13,
2006. The author is deeply grateful to Dr. lan Neary and Professor Vivieme Shue
for their excellent arrangements.
2　At that time, China was not constrained by the WorldTrade Organization (WTO)
rules as it was not a member yet.
3　For the details of the safeguard issue in 2001, see Ohashi (2004 : 185-187).
4　During the Korean War in the early 1950S, the US forces procured a wide variety
of goods and services from Japan. Taking this opportunity, Japan promptly com-
pleted the posトwar reconstruction and went into an orbit of rapid economic
growth. This is called Chosen tokuju (Korean special procurement boom). The
word of tokuju is often used when Japanese economy is unexpectedly booming.
5 In November 2006, Japan's current economic uptrend lasted for four years and
ten months and exceeded the A:a77,agi boom of four years and nine months from
November 1965 to July 1970. This is the longest economic expansion in the post-
war period although most of the Japanese do not feel so actually a sense of boom-
ing economy as they did in the second half of the 1960S. Interesthgly enough, cur-
rent economic uptrend began h December 2001, when China entered the WTO.
6　According to Hong Kong's trade statistics,in2005, 60.2 percent of Hong Kong's
imports from Japan were re-exported to the mainland of China, while 85.7 percent
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0f Hong Kong's exports to Japan were originated in the mainland of China (Census
and Statistics Department 2006). Exports to and imports from Hong Kong should
be practically included i一l Japan's trade with China.
7　China has the largest trade surplus with Hong Kong, which has been regarded as
a gateway of Chinese products re-exported to the United States and Europe.
8　East Asia comprises Japall, NIEs, ASEAN and China. In the same period (1980-
2003), the　intraregional trade rates of the NorthAmerican FreeTrade Area
(NAFTA) and the EU 15 rose from 33.2 percent to 44.9 percent and from 57.2 per-
cent to 60.3 percent respectively (METI 2005 : 285). In other words, current in-
traregional trade rateinEast Asia is higher than that of NAFTA and comparable to
that ofEU 15 in 1980.
9　For the details of the 'flying-geese'model proposed in Akamatsu (1962), see Ko-
jima (2000).
10　For the latest result of the suⅣey, see JBICI (2005).
ll With a sizable amount of investments by the Japanese `Big Three'and their affili-
ates, a leading irldustrial cluster of automobile industIY is emerging in Guangzhou,
wI心ch is called `Detroit in China.'
12　FDI in transport equipment accounted for 44.1 percent of Japanese manufactur-
ing FDI in China in the fiscal year of 2004 (from April 2004 to March 2005) (MOP
2005).
13　Mirdster Bo Xilai also emphasized that Japanese FIFs paid 49 billion RMB of
taxes in the same period.
14　China'S official figure of the unemployment only covers the urban workers regiS-
tered at local labor departments.
15　This fact also reflects Chinese manufacturer'S preference for modular products.
16　According to the Asian internationalinput-output (I-0) tables compiled by the
lnstitute of Developing Economies-JapaII External Trade Organization (IDE -
JETRO), for every 100 units produced by China's machinery industIY, 82.2 units of
Chinese intermediate input goods were domestically sourced, compared with 8.0
units of Japanese parts and devices in 1995 (Ohashi 2006a : 222). Because China
has sought to build a fun set of industrial structure, its dependency on Japanese in-
dustries is much lower than that of other economiesinEast Asia.
17　As their research objects are shifting to China, Japanese scholars and specialists
majoring in the SMEs and local industries earnestly conduct awide range of field
surveysinChina. Their studies shed new lights on specific sectors in China and
make great contributions to China studies in Japan (Ohashi 2006b).
18　According to the joint press statement on his visit to China h October 2006,
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Prime Minister Abe emphasized that "Japan and China would operate the two
wheels of politics and economy and elevate the Japan-China relations tO a higher
dimension" (MOFA 2006). He might have exceeded the stage of separation of poli-
tics from economy and proceeded to the next stage of renovating political relations
with China.
19　These are (i) to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation particularly in the ar-
eas of energy, environmental protection, finance, information and corrununication
technology, and protection of intellectual property, (ii) to promote ministerial-level
dialogue, consultation among relevant authorities, and dialogue among the public
and private sectors in the economic field, (iii) to actively develop exchange, espe-
cially youth exchange, through holding Japan-China Year of Culture and Sports,
and enhance friendly sentiment between the two peoples, taking the opportunity ｡f
the 35th anniversary of the normalization of bilateral relations between JapaI一aI一d
China in 2007, (iv) to enhance mutual trust in the area of security through Japan-
China security dialogue and defense exchange, and (V) to start joint research of
history by Japanese and Chinese scholars.
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